الفهرس 
Title : Assessing the independence of the central bank of Egypt
AbstractOnly 14 pages are availabe for public view
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Abstract
This work aims at quantifying the degree of independence of the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) over the period 1997 {u2013} 2017. To this end, the present study designs two indices for Central Bank Independence (CBI); one tackling the de jure CBI and the other assessing its de facto level. The two proposed measures are expected to outweigh traditional measures as they are relatively more comprehensive and allow a higher level of precision. Moreover, they incorporate the same variables thus allowing comparisons between de jure and de facto independence for any central bank. Furthermore, the two measures are employed to assess the independence of the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE). The analysis reveals that both de jure and de facto independence are advancing in Egypt. Nevertheless, further legal and institutional challenges remain in place concerning CBE financing to government, potential arbitrary dismissal for the central bank governor and board members, as well as CBE{u2019}s involvement in areas beyond the scope of its mandate