الفهرس | Only 14 pages are availabe for public view |
Abstract The present dissertation aims at investigating the U.S Wars In Vietnam and Iraq between logic and non-sense from a thematic and technical perspective in Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 and David Abrams’s Fobbit. The United States’ experience waging counterinsurgency warfare in the Vietnam and Iraq Wars has proved to be a terrible experience. In each war, counterinsurgency warfare was applied to achieve the strategic objectives of American Foreign Policy as outlined by the President of the United States at the outset of each war. Stopping the spread of Communism was a top priority of American Foreign Policy in the years leading up to the Vietnam War. There was a growing belief in the early 1950s that the communist menace would spread country to country around the globe. On August 7, 1954, President Eisenhower advanced the argument that losing the entire Asiatic region to communism would be a defeat to the United States. The anti-war movement altered public perceptions of the utility of continuing to fight the Vietnam War. The Iraq War was supported by a plurality of the American public. However, public support for the war steadily declined throughout the duration of the conflict. By April 2008, a Gallup Poll revealed that 63% of Americans believed that the War in Iraq was a mistake. This dissertation concentrates upon war motifs, technique, and style in the two novels under consideration. |